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Abstract
This paper investigates, by means of simple, three and four strategy games, the oc-
currence of periodic and chaotic behaviour in a smooth version of the Best Response
Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main ￿nding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics,
generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, do occur under the Logit Dy-
namics, even for three strategy games. Moreover, we show that the Logit Dynamics
displays another bifurcation which cannot to occur under the Replicator Dynamics: the
fold catastrophe. Finally, we ￿nd, in a four strategy game, a period-doubling route to
chaotic dynamics under a ￿ weighted￿version of the Logit Dynamics.
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11 Introduction
A large part of the research on evolutionary game dynamics focused on identifying conditions
that ensure uniqueness of and/or convergence to point-attractors such as a Nash Equilib-
rium or an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Roughly speaking, within this ￿ convergence￿
literature one can further distinguish between literature focusing on classes of games (e.g.
Milgrom and Roberts (1991), Nachbar (1990), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002)) and literature
on di⁄erent classes of evolutionary dynamics (e.g. Cressman (1997), Hofbauer (2000), Hof-
bauer and Weibull (1996) , Sandholm (2005), Samuelson and Zhang (1992)). Nevertheless,
there are some examples of periodic and chaotic behaviour in the literature, mostly under a
particular kind of evolutionary dynamics, the Replicator Dynamics. Motivated by the idea of
adding an explicit dynamical process to the static concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy,
Taylor and Jonker (1978) introduced the Replicator Dynamics. It soon found applications in
biological, genetic or chemical systems, those domains where organisms, genes or molecules
evolve over time via replication. The common feature of these systems is that they can be
well approximated by an in￿nite population game with random pairwise matching, giving rise
to a replicator-like evolutionary dynamics given by a low-dimensional dynamical system.
In the realm of the non-convergence literature two issues are particularly important: the
existence of stable periodic and complicated solutions and their robustness (e.g. to slight
perturbations in the payo⁄s matrix). Hofbauer et al. (1980) and Zeeman (1981) investigate
the phase portraits resulting from three-strategy games under the replicator dynamics and
conclude that only ￿ simple￿behaviour - sinks, sources, centers, saddles - can occur. In general,
an evolutionary dynamics together with a n￿strategy game de￿nes a proper n￿1 dynamical
system on the n ￿ 1 simplex. An important result proven by Zeeman (1980), is that under
Replicator Dynamics, there are no generic Hopf bifurcations on the 2-simplex: "When n = 3
all Hopf bifurcations are degenerate"1. Bomze (1983, 1995) provides a detailed classi￿cation of
the planar phase portraits for all 3-strategy games according to the number, location (interior
1Zeeman (1980), pp. 493
2or on boundary of the simplex) and stability properties of the Replicator Dynamics ￿xed
points and identify 49 di⁄erent phase portraits: again, only non-robust cycles are created
usually via a degenerate Hopf bifurcation. In Replicator Dynamics only the "hairline" case of
a continuum of cycles occurs, which are non-generic and disappear by slightly perturbing the
payo⁄parameters. Another possibility in Replicator Dynamics is a so-called heteroclinic cycle
consisting of saddle steady-states on the boundary of the simplex and their connecting saddle
paths. Generic limit cycles do not arise in 3-strategy games under Replicator Dynamics.
Hofbauer (1981) proves that in a 4-strategy game stable limit cycles are possible under
Replicator Dynamics; the proof consists in ￿nding a suitable Lyapunov function whose time
derivative vanishes on the !￿limit set of a periodic orbit. Stable limit cycles are also repor-
ted in Akin (1982) in a genetic model where gene ￿ replicates￿ via the two allele-two locus
selection; this is not surprising as the dynamical system modeling gametic frequencies is three-
dimensional, the dynamics is of Replicator type and the Hofbauer (1981) proof applies here,
as well. Furthermore, Maynard Smith and Hofbauer (1987) prove the existence of a stable
limit cycle for an asymmetric, Battle of Sexes-type genetic model where the allelic frequencies
evolution de￿nes again a 3-D system. Their proof hinges on normal form reduction together
with averaging and elliptic integrals techniques for computing the phase and angular velocity
of the periodic orbit. Stadler and Schuster (1990) perform an impressive systematic search for
both generic transitions (￿xed points exchanging stability) and degenerate transitions (stable
and unstable ￿xed points colliding into a one or two-dimensional manifold at the critical
parameter value) between phase portraits of the replicator equation on 3 ￿ 3 normal form
game.
Chaotic behaviour is found by Schuster et al. (1991) in Replicator Dynamics for a 4-
strategy game matrix derived from an autocatalytic reaction network. They report the stand-
ard Feigenbaum route to chaos: a cascade of period-doubling bifurcations intermingled with
several interior crisis and collapses to a chaotic attractor. Numerical evidence for strange at-
tractors is provided by Skyrms (1992, 2000) for a Replicator Dynamics ￿ ow on two examples
3of a four-strategy game.
Although periodic and chaotic behaviour is substantially documented in the literature
for the Replicator Dynamics, there is much less evidence for such complicated behaviour in
classes of evolutionary dynamics that are more appropriate for human interaction (￿ctitious
play, best response dynamics, adaptive dynamics, etc.). While Shapley (1964) constructs
an example of a non-zero sum game with a limit cycle under ￿ctitious play and Berger and
Hofbauer (2006) ￿nd stable periodic behaviour - two limit cycles bounding an asymptotically
stable annulus - for a di⁄erent dynamic - the Brown-von Newmann Nash (BNN) - a systematic
characterization of (non) generic bifurcations of phase portraits is still missing for the Best
Response dynamics.
The purpose of this paper is to study a smoothed version of the Best Response dynamics
- the Logit Dynamics - to study evolutionary dynamics in simple, well-known, three and
four strategies games such as Rock-Paper-Scissors and Coordination Game. In particular we
focus on generic possibilities of complicated dynamics (i.e. stable limit cycles, multiple steady
states, chaos). The qualitative behaviour of the ￿ evolutionary￿games with Logit Dynamics is
investigated with respect to changes in the payo⁄and behavioural parameters. In addition to
analytical results on local stability and bifurcations, we use the advanced bifurcation software
Matcont (Dhooge et al. (2003)) to numerically detect bifurcation curves in the parameter
space.
Most of the earlier discussed evolutionary game examples are inspired from biology and
not from social sciences. From the perspective of strategic interaction the main criticism
of the ￿ biological￿game-theoretic models is targeted at the intensive use of preprogrammed,
simple imitative play with no role for optimization and innovation. Speci￿cally, in the trans-
ition from animal contests and biology to humans interactions and economics the Replicator
Dynamics seems no longer adequate to model the rationalistic and ￿ competent￿forms of be-
haviour (Sandholm (2008)). Best Response Dynamics would be more applicable to human
interaction as it assumes that agents are able to optimally compute and play a (myopic) ￿ best
4response￿to the current state of the population. But, while the Replicator Dynamics ap-
peared to impose an unnecessarily loose rationality assumption the Best Response dynamics
moves to the other extreme: it is too stringent in terms of rationality. Another drawback is
that, technically, the best reply is not necessarily unique and this leads to a di⁄erential inclu-
sion instead of an ordinary di⁄erential equation. One way of solving these problems was to
stochastically perturb the matrix payo⁄s and derive, via the discrete choice theory, a ￿ noisy￿
Best Response Dynamics, called the Logit Dynamics. Mathematically it is a ￿ smoothed￿ , well-
behaved dynamics while from the strategic interaction point of view it models a boundedly
rational player/agent. Moreover, from a nonlinear dynamical systems perspective the Replic-
ator Dynamic is, in fact, non-generic in dimension two and only degenerate Hopf bifurcations
can arise on the 2-simplex. In sum, apart from its conjectured generic properties, the Logit
is recommended by the need for modelling players with di⁄erent degrees of rationality and
for smoothing the Best Response correspondence.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the Logit Dynamics, while Section
3 gives a brief overview of the Hopf bifurcation theory. In Section 4 the Logit Dynamics is
implemented on Rock-Scissors-Paper and in Section 5 on a Coordination game. Section 6
discusses an example of chaotic dynamics under a frequency-weighted version of the Logit
Dynamics and Section 7 concludes.
2 Replicator vs. Logit Dynamics
Evolutionary game theory deals with games played within a (large) population over a long
time horizon (evolution scale). Its main ingredients are the underlying normal form game -
with payo⁄ matrix A[n ￿ n] - and the evolutionary dynamic class which de￿nes a dynamical
system on the state of the population. In a symmetric framework, the strategic interaction
takes the form of random matching with each of the two players choosing from a ￿nite set
of available strategies E = fE1;E2;:::Eng: For every time t; x(t) denotes the n-dimensional
5vector of frequencies for each strategy/type Ei and belongs to the n￿1 dimensional simplex
￿n￿1 = fx 2 Rn :
n P
i=1
xi = 1g: Under the assumption of random interactions strategy Ei
￿tness would be simply determined by averaging the payo⁄s from each strategic interaction
with weights given by the state of the population x . Denoting with f(x) the payo⁄ vector,
its components - individual payo⁄ or ￿tness of strategy i in biological terms - are:
fi(x) =(Ax)i (1)
Sandholm (2008) rigorously de￿nes an evolutionary dynamics as a map assigning to each
population game a di⁄erential equation _ x = V(x) on the simplex ￿n￿1: In order to derive
such an ￿ aggregate￿level vector ￿eld from individual choices he introduces a revision protocol
￿ij(f(x);x) indicating, for each pair (i;j) , the rate of switching(￿ij) from the currently played
strategy i to strategy j: The mean vector ￿eld is obtained as:








Based on the computational requirements/quality of the revision protocol ￿ the set of evol-
utionary dynamics splits into two large classes: imitative dynamics and pairwise comparison
(￿ competent￿play). The ￿rst class is represented by the most famous dynamics, the Replicator
Dynamic (Taylor and Jonker (1978)) which can be easily derived by substituting into (2) the
pairwise proportional revision protocol: ￿ij(f(x);x) = xj[fj(x)￿fi(x)]+ (player i switches to
strategy j at a rate proportional with the probability of meeting an j-strategist(xj) and with
the excess payo⁄ of opponent j-[fj(x)￿fi(x)]- i⁄ positive):
_ xi = xi[fi(x)￿ ￿ f(x)] = xi[(Ax)i￿xAx] (3)
where ￿ f(x) = xAx is the average population payo⁄.
6Although widely applicable to biological/chemical models, the Replicator Dynamics lacks
the proper individual choice, micro-foundations which would make it attractive for modelling
human interactions. The alternative - Best Response dynamics - already introduced by
Gilboa and Matsui (1991) requires extra computational abilities from agents, beyond merely
sampling randomly a player and observing the di⁄erence in payo⁄: speci￿cally being able to
compute a best reply strategy to the current population state:




Discrete choice models-the Logit evolutionary dynamics
Apart from the highly unrealistic assumptions regarding agents capacity to compute a perfect
best reply to a given population state there is also the drawback that (4) de￿nes a di⁄erential
inclusion, i.e. a set-valued function. The best responses may not be unique and multiple
trajectory paths can emerge from the same initial conditions. A ￿ smoothed￿approximation
of the Best Reply dynamics - the Logit dynamics - was introduced by Fudenberg and Levine











where ￿ > 0 is the noise level. Here ￿ij represents the probability of player i switching to
strategy j when provided with a revision opportunity. For high levels of noise the choice is
fully random (no optimization) while for ￿ close to zero the switching probability is almost
one.
7Another way to obtain (5) is to deterministically perturb the set-valued best reply corres-
pondence (4) with a strictly concave function V (y) (Hofbauer (2000)):
BR￿(x) = arg max
y2￿n￿1 [y ￿ (Ax) + V￿(y)]
For a particular choice of the perturbation function V￿(y) = ￿
P
i=1;n
yi logyi; y 2 ￿
n￿1 the
resulting objective function is single-valued and smooth; the ￿rst order condition yields the






Plugging the Logit revision protocol (5) back into the general form of the mean ￿eld
dynamic (2) and making the substitution ￿ = ￿￿1 we obtain a well-behaved system of o.d.e.￿ s,






The quantal response equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), also called ￿ logit equilib-
ria￿for a logistic response function, are ￿xed points of the Logit Dynamics. When ￿ ! 1 the
probability of switching to the discrete ￿ best response￿j is close to one while for a very low
intensity of choice (￿ ! 0) the switching rate is independent of the actual performance of the
alternative strategies (equal probability mass is put on each of them). The Logit dynamics
displays some properties characteristic to the logistic growth function, namely high growth
rates (_ xi) for small values of xi and growth ￿ levelling o⁄￿when close to the upper bound.
This means that a speci￿c frequency xi grows faster when it is already large in the Replicator
Dynamics relative to the Logit dynamics.
83 Hopf and degenerate Hopf bifurcations
Since the possible existence of stable limit cycles is an important theme in this paper, for
the convenience of the general reader we brie￿ y review the main bifurcation route towards
a stable limit cycle, the Hopf bifurcation. In a one-parameter family of continuous-time
systems, the only generic bifurcation through which a limit cycle is created or disappears is
the non-degenerate Hopf bifurcation. The planar case will be discussed ￿rst and then, brie￿ y,
the methods to reduce higher-dimensional systems to the two-dimensional case.
Assume we are given a parameter-dependent, two dimensional system (as in, for example,
Kuznetsov (1995)):
_ x = f(x;￿);x 2 R
2;￿ 2 R; f smooth, (7)
with a steady state at x￿ = 0; i.e. f(0;￿) = 0 and the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the
￿xed point x￿ = 0 having a pair of purely imaginary, complex conjugate eigenvalues at the
bifurcation value ￿ = 0; i.e. ￿1;2 = ￿(￿) ￿ i!(￿) with ￿(￿) < 0 for ￿ < 0;￿(0) = 0 and
￿(￿) > 0 for ￿ > 0:







6= 0 - transversality condition
(ii) l1(0) 6= 0, where l1(0) is the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient3 - nondegeneracy condition,
then the system (7) undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at ￿ = 0: As ￿ increases the steady
state changes stability from a stable focus into an unstable focus.
There are two types of Hopf bifurcation, depending on the sign of the ￿rst Lyapunov
coe¢ cient l1(0) :
2Genericity usually refer to transversality and non-degeneracy conditions. Rougly speaking, the trans-
versality condition means that complex eigenvalues cross the real line at non-zero speed. The nondegeneracy
condition implies non-zero higher-order coe¢ cients in equation (10) below. It ensures that the singularity
x￿ is typical (i.e. ￿ nondegenerate￿ ) for a class of singularities satisfying certain bifurcation conditions. See
Kuznetsov (1995) pp. 89 ￿ 98 for a complete mathematical description of the Hopf bifurcation.
3This is the coe¢ cient of the third order term in the normal form of the Hopf bifurcation (see equation
(10) below).
9(a) If l1(0) < 0 then the Hopf bifurcation is supercritical: the stable focus x becomes
unstable for ￿ > 0 and is surrounded by an isolated, stable closed orbit (limit cycle).
(b)If l1(0) > 0 then the Hopf bifurcation is subcritical: for ￿ < 0 the basin of attraction
of the stable focus x￿ is surrounded by an unstable cycle which shrinks and disappears as ￿
crosses the critical value ￿ = 0 while the system diverges quickly from the neighbourhood of
x￿.
In case (a) the stable cycle is created immediately after ￿ reaches the critical value and
thus the Hopf bifurcation is called supercritical, while in case (b) the unstable cycle already
exists before the critical value, i.e. a subcritical Hopf bifurcation. The supercritical Hopf is
also known as a soft or non-catastrophic bifurcation because , even when the system becomes
unstable, it still lingers within a small neighbourhood of the equilibrium bounded by the
limit cycle, while the subcritical case is a sharp/catastrophic bifurcation as the system moves
quickly far away from the unstable equilibrium.
If the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient l1(0) = 0 then there is a degeneracy in the third order
terms of the normal form and , if other, higher order nondegeneracy conditions hold(i.e. non-
vanishing second Lyapunov coe¢ cient) then the bifurcation is called Bautin or generalized
Hopf bifurcation. This happens when the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient vanishes at the given
equilibrium x￿ but the following higher-order genericity4 conditions hold:
(i) l2(0) 6= 0, where l2(0) is the second Lyapunov coe¢ cient - nondegeneracy condition
(ii) the map ￿ ! (￿(￿);l1(￿)) is regular (i.e. the Jacobian matrix is nonsingular) at the
critical value ￿ = 0 - transversality condition.
Depending on the sign of l2(0), at the Bautin point the system may display a limit cycle
bifurcating into two or more cycles , coexistence of stable and unstable cycles which collide
4Technically, these ￿ higher-order￿genericity conditions ensure that there are smooth invertible coordinate
transformations, depending smoothly on parameters, together with parameter changes and (possibly) time
re-parametrizations such that (7) can be reduced to a ￿ simplest￿form, the normal form. See Kuznetsov (1995)
pp. 309 ￿ 316 for more details on the Bautin (generalized Hopf) bifurcation and for an expression for the
second Lyapunov coe¢ cient l2(0):
10and disappear, together with so-called cycle blow-up.
Computation of the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient
For the planar case, the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient l1(0) can be computed without explicitly
deriving the normal form, from the Taylor coe¢ cients of a transformed version of the original
vector ￿eld. The computation of l1(0) for higher dimensional systems makes use of the Center
Manifold Theorem by which the orbit structure of the original system near (x￿;￿), is fully
determined by its restriction to the two-dimensional center manifold5. On the center manifold


































where ￿(￿) is an eigenvalue of the linearized vector ￿eld around the steady state and the
nonlinear functions f1(x;y;￿);f2(x;y;￿) of order O(jxj
2) are derived from the original vector
￿eld. Wiggins (2003) also provides a procedure for transforming (7) into (8). Speci￿cally,
for any vector ￿eld _ x = F(x);x 2 R2 let DF(x￿) denote the Jacobian evaluated at the ￿xed
point x￿.Then _ x = F(x) is equivalent to:
_ x = Jx + T
￿1 ￿ F(Tx) (9)
where J stands for the real Jordan canonical form of DF(x￿);T is the matrix transforming
DF(x￿) into the Jordan form, and ￿ F(x) = F(x) ￿ DF(x￿)x: At the Hopf bifurcation point





































5The center manifold is the invariant manifold spanned by the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues
with zero real part (Kuznetsov (1995) pp. 157).
114 Rock-Scissors-Paper Games
The Rock-Paper-Scissors class of games (or games of cyclical dominance) formalize strategic
interactions where each strategy Ei is an unique best response to strategy Ei+1 for i = 1;2








E1 0 ￿2 ￿"3
E2 ￿"1 0 ￿3
E3 ￿1 ￿"2 0
1
C C C C
C C C
A
;￿i;"i ￿ 0 (11)
If matrix (11) is circulant (i.e. ￿i = ￿;"i = ";i = 1;2;3) then the RSP game is called circulant,
while for a non-circulant matrix (11) we have a generalized RSP game7. The behavior of
Replicator and Logit Dynamics on the class of circulant RSP games will be investigated, both
analytically and numerically, in the ￿rst and second part of this subsection, respectively.
Circulant RSP Game and Replicator Dynamics
The circulant RSP game is a ￿rst generalization of the classical, zero-sum form of RSP game
as discussed in, for instance, Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003):
A =
0






C C C C
A
;￿;" > 0 (12)
6See Weissing (1991) for a thourough charaterization of the discrete-time Replicator Dynamics behavior
on the most general representation of this class of games, i.e. the matrix (11) before the normalization.
7We focus on the simple case of circulant RSP game, which is su¢ cient for our purpose; see Chapter 2 of
Ochea (2009) for the numerical computation of bifurcation curves under continuous-time Logit Dynamics on
the generalized RSP games.
12Letting x(t) = (x(t);y(t);z(t)) denote the population state at time instance t de￿ne a point
from the 2-dimensional simplex, the payo⁄ vector [Ax] is obtained via (1):
[Ax] =
0






C C C C
A
(13)
Average ￿tness of the population is:
xAx = x(y￿ ￿ z") + y (￿x" + z￿) + z (x￿ ￿ y") (14)






_ x = x[y￿ ￿ z" ￿ (x(y￿ ￿ z") + y (￿x" + z￿) + z (x￿ ￿ y"))]
_ y = y[￿x" + z￿ ￿ (x(y￿ ￿ z") + y (￿x" + z￿) + z (x￿ ￿ y"))]






While Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) use the Poincare-Bendixson theorem together with the
Dulac criterion to prove that limit cycles cannot occur in games with three strategies under the
replicator we will derive this negative result using tools from dynamical systems, in particular
the Hopf bifurcation and ￿ normal form￿theory. The same toolkit will be applied next to the
Logit Dynamic and a positive result - stable limit cycles do occur - will be derived.
As we are interested in limit cycles within the simplex we only consider interior ￿xed
points of this system (any replicator dynamic has the simplex vertices as steady states, too).
For the parameter range ";￿ > 0 the barycentrum x￿ = [x = 1=3;y = 1=3;z = 1=3] is always
an interior ￿xed point of (15). In order to analyze its stability properties we obtain ￿rst, by












￿x" + 2xy" ￿ x2￿ + 2x2" + x3￿ ￿ x3" + xy2￿ + x2y￿ ￿ xy2" ￿ x2y"




We can detect the Hopf bifurcation threshold at the point where the trace of the Jacobian
matrix of (16) is equal to zero. The Jacobian evaluated at the barycentrical steady state x￿ is 2
6
4
" ￿ + "
￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿
3
7






(" + ￿)2 and trace "￿￿: For
￿ < "; x￿ is an unstable focus, at ￿ = " a pair of imaginary eigenvalues crosses the imaginary
axis(￿1;2 = ￿i
p
3￿), while for ￿ > " x￿ becomes a stable focus (see Fig. (1) below). This is
consistent with Theorem 6 in Zeeman (1980) which states that the determinant of the matrix
A determines the stability properties of the interior ￿xed point. In the circulant RSP game
(12) DetA = "3 ￿￿
3 vanishes for " = ￿: By the same Theorem 6 in Zeeman (1980) the vector
￿eld (15) has a center in the 2-simplex and a continuum of cycles if DetA = 0:
Alternatively, our local bifurcation analysis shows that a Hopf bifurcation occurs when
" = ￿ and in order to ascertain its features - sub/supercritical or degenerate - we have to
further investigate the nonlinear vector ￿eld near the (x￿;" = ￿) point. The Hopf bifurcation












￿x￿ + 2xy￿ + x2￿




Using equation (8) and the eigenvalues ￿1;2 = ￿i
p
3￿ at the Hopf bifurcation point (" =







3￿ ￿ x￿ + 2xy￿ + x2￿
f2(x;y) = ￿x
p




14We can now state the following result:
Lemma 1 All Hopf bifurcations are degenerate in the circulant Rock-Scissor-Paper game
under Replicator Dynamics.
Proof. From the nonlinear functions f1(x;y);f2(x;y) derived above we can easily compute
the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient (10) as l1("Hopf = ￿
Hopf) = 0 which means that there is a ￿rst
degeneracy in the third order terms from the Taylor expansion of the normal form. The
detected bifurcation is a degenerate Hopf bifurcation8.
Although, in general, the orbital structure at a degenerate Hopf bifurcation may be ex-
tremely complicated (see Section 3), for our particular vector ￿eld induced by the Replicator
Dynamics it can be shown by Lyapunov function techniques (Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003),
Zeeman (1980)) that a continuum of cycles is born exactly at the critical parameter value9.









￿ = 0:6;" = 1









￿ = 1;" = 1









￿ = 1:1;" = 1
Figure 1: Rock-Scissors-Paper and Replicator Dynamics for ￿xed " = 1 and varying ￿. Qual-
itative changes in the phase portraits - unstable focus (Panel (a)), continuum of cycles (Panel
(b)) and stable focus (Panel (c)) - occur as we increase ￿ from below to above ".
8Since all 3rd and higher-order terms in (18) are zero, the Hopf bifurcation has, in fact, an "in￿nite number
of degeneracies" with all higher order Lyapunov coe¢ cients li("Hopf = ￿
Hopf) = 0;i ￿ 2: This explains why,
for the Replicator Dynamics, a continuum of cycles exists after the Hopf bifurcation.
9The absence of a generic Hopf bifurcation does not su¢ ce to conclude that the vector ￿eld admits no
isolated periodic orbits and ￿ global￿results are required (e.g. the Bendixson-Dulac method, positive divergence
of the vector ￿eld on the simplex).
15It is worthwhile pointing out the connection between our local (in)stability results and
the static concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). As already noted in the literature
(Zeeman (1980), Hofbauer (2000)) ESS implies (global) asymptotic stability under a wide class
of evolutionary dynamics - Replicator Dynamics, Best Response and Smooth Best Response
Dynamics, Brown-von Newmann-Nash, etc. The reverse implication does not hold in general,
i.e. the local stability analysis does not su¢ ce to qualify an attractor as an ESS. However,
for ￿ < " we have shown that x￿ is an unstable focus and we can conclude that, for this class
of RSP games, the barycentrum is not an ESS. Indeed, the case ￿ < " is the so called bad
RSP game (Sandholm (2008)) which is known not to have an ESS. For ￿ > " we are in the
good RSP game and it does have an interior ESS which coincides with the asymptotically
stable rest point x￿ of the Replicator Dynamics. Last, if ￿ = " (i.e. standard RSP) then x￿
is a neutrally stable strategy/state and we proved that in this zero-sum game the Replicator
undergoes a degenerate Hopf bifurcation. The Hopf bifurcation scenario is illustrated in Fig.
1 for a ￿xed value of " = 1:
Circulant RSP Game and Logit Dynamics
The Logit evolutionary dynamics (6) applied to the circulant normal form game (12) leads to
the following vector ￿eld:
2












7 7 7 7
5
(19)





exp(￿(x￿￿y"))+exp(￿(￿x"+￿(￿x￿y+1)))+exp(￿(y￿￿"(￿x￿y+1))) ￿ x = 0
exp(￿(￿x"+￿(￿x￿y+1)))




16The 2 ￿ dim simplex barycentrum [x = 1=3;y = 1=3;z = 1=3] remains a ￿xed point
























;0 < ￿ < " (21)
We notice that for the zero-sum RSP game (" = ￿) - unlike Replicator Dynamics which
exhibited a degenerate Hopf at " = ￿ - the barycentrum is always asymptotically stable
(Re￿1;2 = ￿1) under Logit Dynamics. For " < ￿, i.e. the "good" RSP game, the interior
steady state is always locally stable under Logit Dynamics. We have the following:
Lemma 2 The Logit Dynamics (19) on the circulant Rock-Scissors-Paper game exhibits a
generic Hopf bifurcation and, therefore, has limit cycles. Moreover, all such Hopf bifurcations
are supercritical, i.e. the limit cycle is born stable.
Proof. Condition (21) gives the necessary ￿rst-order condition for Hopf bifurcation to
occur; in order to show that the Hopf bifurcation is non-degenerate we have to compute the
￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient l1(￿
Hopf;";￿) according to (10) and check whether it is non-zero.
The analytical form of this coe¢ cient takes a complicated expression of exponential terms





3(3" ￿ 3￿)2 < 0; " > ￿ > 0:
Computer simulations of this route to a stable cycle are shown in Fig. 2. We notice that
as ￿ increases from 10 to 35 (i.e. the noise level is decreasing) the interior stable steady state
looses stability via a supercritical Hopf bifurcation and a small, stable limit cycle emerges
17around the unstable steady state. Unlike Replicator Dynamics, stable cyclic behavior does
occur under the Logit dynamics even for three-strategy games.








(a) Stable focus, ￿ = 10








(b) Generic Hopf, ￿ = 30








(c) Limit cycle, ￿ = 35
Figure 2: Rock-Scissors-Paper and Logit Dynamics for ￿xed game " = 1;￿ = 0:8 and di⁄erent
values of the behavioral parameter ￿. Qualitative changes in the phase portraits: a stable
interior ￿xed point (Panel (a)) loses stability when the critical threshold ￿ = 30 is hit, via
a generic, supercritical Hopf bifurcation (Panel (b)) and, if ￿ is pushed up even further, a
stable limit cycle is born (Panel (c)).
Similar cycles can be detected in the payo⁄ parameter space as in Fig. 3 where the noise
level is kept constant and the game parameter ￿ is allowed to change.








(a) Stable focus, ￿ = 1








(b) Hopf, ￿ = 0:399








(c) Limit cycle, ￿ = 0:1
Figure 3: Rock-Scissors-Paper and Logit Dynamics for ￿xed behavioral parameter ￿ = 10
and free game parameter ￿ [" = 1]. Qualitative changes in the phase portraits: a stable
interior ￿xed point (Panel (a)) loses stability when the critical threshold ￿ = 0:399 is hit, via
a generic, supercritical Hopf bifurcation (Panel (b)). Panel (c) display a stable limit cycle for
￿ = 0:1 that attracts trajectories originating both outside and inside the cycle.
18Figure 4 depicts a curve of Hopf bifurcations in the (￿;"￿￿) parameter space. As we cross
this Hopf curve from below the stable interior ￿xed point loses stability and a stable periodic
attractor surrounds it. The picture summarizes the possible types of dynamical behavior for
the "good" and the "bad" Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Thus, for " < ￿ (i.e. "good" RSP
game) the interior, fully mixed steady state is always locally10 stable under Logit Dynamics,
similar to the behavior of Replicator Dynamics on this class of RSP games. For " > ￿ (i.e.
"bad" RSP game) the behavior depends on how sensitive players are to di⁄erences in ￿tness,
and, unlike Replicator Dynamics, Logit displays richer dynamics.
















Figure 4: Rock-Scissors-Paper and Logit Dynamics: Supercritical Hopf curve in (￿;" ￿ ￿)
parameter space. Continuation of a detected co-dimension I singularity (i.e. Hopf bifurcation)
with respect to a second parameter gives rise to a curve of supercritical Hopf points in the
circulant RSP class of games.
10Numerical simulations suggest that for " < ￿ the steady state is even globally stable.
195 Coordination Game
Using topological arguments, Zeeman (1980) shows that three-strategies games have at most
one interior, isolated ￿xed point under Replicator Dynamics11. This implies that a fold12
catastrophe in which two isolated ￿xed points collide and disappear when some parameter
is varied, cannot occur in the interior of the simplex. In this section we show - by means
of the classical coordination game - that multiple, isolated, interior steady-states may exist
under Logit Dynamics and show that the fold catastrophe occurs when we alter the intensity
of choice ￿. We use advanced numerical tools (Dhooge et al. (2003)) for detecting fold
catastrophe bifurcation curves in the parameter space. As our goal is to investigate possible
routes to multiplicity of steady states, we consider the simplest version of a symmetric 3 ￿ 3
pure coordination game, given by the following payo⁄ matrix:
A =
0
B B B B
@
1 ￿ " 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1 + "
1
C C C C
A
;0 < " < 1: (22)
Coordination Game and Replicator Dynamics





_ x = x[x(￿" + 1) ￿ (y2 + z2 (" + 1) + x2 (￿" + 1))]
_ y = y[y ￿ (y2 + z2 (" + 1) + x2 (￿" + 1))]






This systems has the following ￿xed points in simplex coordinates:
11See Theorem 3 pp. 478 in Zeeman (1980).
12In a parameter-dependent, continous-time dynamical system a fold bifurcation occurs when the Jacobian
matrix evaluated at the critical equilibrium has a zero eigenvalue. Technically, other higher-order non-
degeneracy conditions must hold, as well. See Kuznetsov (1995) pp. 81 ￿ 84 for a complete treatment of the
fold bifurcation.
20(i) 3 stable nodes at the simplex vertices: (1;0;0);(0;1;0);(0;0;1)












The eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian evaluated at each of the above ￿xed points
are:
A [x = 0;y = 1;z = 0]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2;3 = ￿1
B [x = 1;y = 0;z = 0]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2;3 = " ￿ 1
C [x = 0;y = 0;z = 1]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2;3 = ￿" ￿ 1
O [x = "+1
3￿"2;y = 1￿"2
3￿"2;z = 1￿"
3￿"2]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2 = "2￿1
"2￿3 > 0; for " 2 (0;1)
M [x = 1
2￿";y = 1￿"
2￿";z = 0]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2 = ￿1￿"
"￿2
N [x = 1
2￿";y = 0;z = 1￿"
2￿"]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2 = ￿ 1
￿4"+"2+4 (2" + "2 ￿ "3 ￿ 2)
P [x = 0;y = 1
2￿";z = 1￿"
2￿"]; eigenvalues: ￿1;2 = ￿ 1
￿4"+"2+4 (" + "2 ￿ "3 ￿ 2)
This ￿xed points structure is consistent with Zeeman (1980) result that no fold cata-
strophes (i.e. multiple, isolated and interior steady states) can occur under the Replicator
Dynamics. The three saddles together with the interior source de￿ne the basins of attractions
for the stable nodes at simplex vertices. The boundaries of the simplex are invariant under
Replicator Dynamics13 and it su¢ ces to show that the segment lines [OM];[ON], and [OP];
as illustrated in Fig. 5 , are also invariant under this dynamics.








Figure 5: Coordination Game with " = 0:1 and Replicator Dynamics - Invariant manifolds
Lemma 3 The segment lines [OM];[ON], and [OP] are invariant under Replicator Dynam-
ics and they form, along with the simplex edges, the boundaries of the basins of attraction for
the three stable steady states A, B and C at the vertices.




_ x = x2 ￿ x3 ￿ xy2 ￿ x2" + x3" ￿ x(￿x ￿ y + 1)
2 ￿ x"(￿x ￿ y + 1)
2
_ y = y2 ￿ y3 ￿ x2y + x2y" ￿ y (￿x ￿ y + 1)














x(￿" + 1) ￿ x2 (￿" + 1) ￿ x2 (￿" + 1)




x(￿" + 1) ￿ x2 (￿" + 1) ￿ x2 (￿" + 1)
2 ￿ (" + 1)(￿x ￿ y + 1)
2￿
= 1 ￿ ";
which is exactly the slope of [MO]. Similarly, invariance results are obtained for segments
[ON] and [OP] de￿ned by x(1 ￿ ") = z(1 + ") and y = z(1 + "):
Analytically, the size of the basins of attraction of the three di⁄erent stable nodes are
22"nA A(1;0;0) B(0;1;0) C(0;0;1) Long-Run Average Welfare
0 33:33% 33:33% 33:33% 1
0:1 29:9% 33:2% 36:7% 1:0048
0:5 15:5% 30:3% 54:54% 1:1986
0:6 8:92% 12:18% 78:90% 1:4199
0:9 1:2% 12% 86:7% 1:512
Table 1: Coordination Game, Replicator Dynamics￿ relative sizes of basins of attraction of 3
stable steady states and long-run average welfare for di⁄erent payo⁄-perturbation parameter
". As payo⁄ di⁄erences " increases the long-run average welfare increases
determined by the areas of the polygons delineated by the invariant manifolds [OM];[ON],
and [OP] and the 2-dim simplex boundaries. These areas are given by:




























































































3(" + 1) 1￿"
(2￿")(3￿"2)
￿ ￿ ￿
















3(" + 1) 3￿2"
(4￿2")(3￿"2)
￿ ￿ ￿
The relative size of the basins vary with the payo⁄ parameter " as in Table 1. When
the payo⁄ asymmetries are small, i.e. " is small, the simplex of initial conditions is divided
equally among the three stable equilibria(Fig. 6a). As the payo⁄ discrepancies increase, i.e.
when " increases the relative size of the welfare-maximizing equilibrium (0;0;1) increases (see
Fig. 6b).









(a) A"[" = 0:1]









(b) A"[" = 0:8]
Figure 6: Coordination Game and Replicator Dynamics-basins of attraction for di⁄erent
values of the payo⁄ di⁄erence "
Coordination Game and Logit Dynamics
We choose a small payo⁄ perturbation, " = 0:1; such that system is ￿ close￿to the symmetric
basins of attraction A,B and C in the Replicator Dynamics. With this perturbation size, the
Logit Dynamics for the payo⁄ matrix A of the Coordination game (22) de￿nes the following
vector ￿eld on the simplex of frequencies (x;y;z) of strategies E1;E2;E3, respectively:
2












7 7 7 7
5
(25)
Multiple Equilibria. In order to ascertain the number of (asymptotically) stable ￿xed
points on the two-dimensional simplex we ￿rst run simulations for increasing values of ￿ and
for di⁄erent initial conditions within the simplex as illustrated in Fig. 7.
Case I. Low values of ￿; ￿ ￿ 0 (Fig. 7a). One interior steady state, the barycentrum is
24globally attracting, i.e. irrespective of the initial proportions, the population will settle down
to a state with almost equal fractions.
Case II. High values of ￿;￿ ￿ 10 (Fig. 7d-f). Three co-existing stable steady states
asymptotically approaching the vertices of the simplex as ￿ increases. The size of their basins
of attraction is determined both by the strategy relative payo⁄advantage and by the value of
the intensity of choice. The initial fractions of the strategies are important for which strategy
will eventually win the evolutionary competition.
Case III. Intermediate values of ￿;￿ = 3 (Fig. 7bc). Co-existence of two steady-states
for moderate values of the sensitivity to payo⁄s di⁄erentials parameter, with di⁄erent initial

































































(f) ￿ = 10, (x0;y0;z0) = (0:33;0:33;0:34)
Figure 7: Coordination Game[" = 0:1] and Logit Dynamics -Unique stable steady state for ￿
low (Panel(a)), two interior, isolated stable steady states for moderate ￿ (Panels (b)-(c)) and
three, co-existing stable steady states for high ￿ = 10 (Panels (d)-(f)).
26Bifurcations. Unlike Replicator, the Logit Dynamics displays multiple, interior isolated
steady states created via a fold bifurcation. In a 3-strategy Coordination game, three interior
stable steady states emerge through a sequence of two saddle-node bifurcations, as illustrated
in Fig. 8.
For small values of ￿ the unique, interior stable steady state is close to the simplex
barycentrum (1=3;1=3;1=3). As ￿ increases this steady state travels14 in the direction of
the Pareto-superior equilibrium (0;0;1). A ￿rst fold bifurcation occurs at ￿ = 2:77 (see Fig.
8a) and two new ￿xed points are created, one stable and one unstable. If we increase ￿ even
further (￿ ￿ 3:26) a second fold bifurcation takes place and two additional equilibria emerge,
one stable and one unstable. Finally, two new ￿xed points arise at ￿ = 4:31 via a saddle-source
bifurcation15. Three stable steady states co-exist for large values of the intensity of choice ￿.
Note that the three stable steady states coincide with the ￿ logit equilibria￿of McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995) that converge to the pure strategy Nash equilibria when ￿ ! 1. A similar
sequence of bifurcations is visible in the payo⁄ parameter space (Fig. 8b) where, for a ￿xed
value of the intensity of choice, a sequence of fold bifurcations occur in which steady states
collide and disappear as the payo⁄ di⁄erence " increases. Hence, in the Logit Dynamics for
a given "rationality level" ￿; a unique stable steady state, approaching the Pareto-optimal
steady state, will arise when the payo⁄ di⁄erence " is su¢ ciently large.
14We point out an interesting similarity with Turocy (2005) "homotopy" method of tracing logit equilibria in
normal form games. He shows that, generically, there is unique branch connecting the barrycentrum for ￿ = 0
and a unique equilibrium - the Pareto-dominant equilbrium (0;0;1) in our simple 3￿3 pure Coordination game
- as ￿ ! 1: This homotopy-based branch coincides with the lower branch of our numerically "continued"
equilibria (see the bottom (x;￿) bifurcation curve in Fig. 8a). Thus, a bifurcation-based method of computing
equibria in normal form games may be an alternative to the homotopy method.
15A saddle-source bifurcation it is a fold bifurcation where two unstable steady states are created: one
saddle ￿xed point (i.e. at least one eigenvalue with positive real part) and one source (i.e. both eigenvalues
have positive real part).












(a) Cascade of Fold bifurcations in
(x,￿) space. "=0.1

















(b) Cascade of Fold bifurcations in (x,")
space. ￿=5.
Figure 8: Coordination Game and Logit Dynamics. Curves of equilibria along with codimen-
sion I singularities, in this case fold catastrophe (LP) points. Panel (a): the multiplicity of
steady states arises through a sequence of three fold bifurcations when ￿ increases. Panel
(b): two fold bifurcations in which steady states collide and disappear as payo⁄ parameter "
increases.
The continuation of the fold curves in the (￿;") parameter space allows the detection of
codimension II16 bifurcations. Co-dimension II bifurcation points are important, because they
act as "organizing centers" of the complete bifurcation diagram with co-dimension I bifurc-
ation curves. Thus, the cusp points (CP) in Fig. 9 organize the entire bifurcating scenario
and are endpoints of the saddle-node bifurcation curves along which multiple, interior steady
states are created in the Coordination Game under the smoothed best response dynamics.
When a fold bifurcation curve is crossed from below two additional equilibria are created: one
stable and one unstable after a saddle-node bifurcation and two unstable steady states after
a saddle-source bifurcation. If choice is virtually random (￿ ￿ 0) there is an unique steady
state while if ￿ increases, the number of steady states increases from 1 to 3, then from 3 to 5
and, last, from 5 to 7.
16The codimension of a bifurcation de￿nes the number of parameters that needs to be varied in order for
the bifurcation to occur generically (Kuznetsov (1995) ).












(a) Curves of fold points in the (";￿)
space














(b) Cusp points (CP) organize the
equilibria structure
Figure 9: Coordination Game and Logit Dynamics. Curves of fold bifurcations along with
detected codimension II singularities - in this case, cusp (CP) points - traced in the (";￿)
parameter space. The co-dimension II bifurcation points act as "organizing centers" of the
fold bifurcation curves. As the intensity of choice increases, the number of steady states
increases from 1 to 3, then from 3 to 5 and, last, from 5 to 7.
Basins of Attraction. The numerical computation of the basins of attraction for di⁄erent
equilibria reveals interesting properties of the Logit dynamics from a social welfare perspective.
We construct a measure of long-run aggregate welfare as the payo⁄at the stable steady state
weighted by the size of the corresponding basin of attraction. While for ￿ ! 1 the basins of
attraction are similar in size as in the Replicator Dynamics (Panels (a), (c), (d) in Fig. 10),
for moderate levels of rationality the population manages to coordinate close to the Pareto










(b) ￿ = 10=4; one steady state ￿ close￿





(c) ￿ = 10=3; two stable steady states







(d) ￿ = 15; three stable steady
states
Figure 10: Coordination Game [" = 0:1] and Logit Dynamics: Panels (a)-(d), basins of
attraction for increasing values of the intensity of choice ￿. Fractions converging to each of
the steady state are indicated in the box.
Fig. 11 illustrates how the long-run average welfare depends on the parameter ￿ for
di⁄erent levels of the payo⁄ di⁄erence ". Long run average welfare increases with the payo⁄
di⁄erence " but evolves non-monotonically with respect to the behavioural parameter ￿ (Fig.
11ab). Long-run average welfare increases as the fully mixed equilibrium moves towards the
Pareto optimal (0;0;1) vertex, attains a maximum just before the ￿rst fold bifurcation occurs
30at ￿
LP1 = 2:77 and then decreases, approaching the Replicator Dynamics average welfare, in
the limit of ￿ ! 1. As our measure of average welfare is constructed as payo⁄s at steady
state weighted by the corresponding sizes of basins of attraction, there are two e⁄ects driving
the welfare peak before ￿
LP1 is hit. First, the steady state payo⁄ is higher the closer the
steady state is to the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Second, there is a ￿ basin of attraction￿
e⁄ect: before the ￿rst fold bifurcation threshold ￿ = ￿
LP1 is reached the entire simplex is
attracted by the unique steady state lying close to the optimal equilibrium. Intuitively, the
noisy choices in the low-beta regime help players escape the path-dependency built into the
game and coordinate close to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
In the limiting case ￿ ! 1; the stable ￿xed points of the Logit Dynamics (i.e. the logit
equilibria) coincide with the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the underlying game which,
for this Coordination Game, are exactly the stable nodes of the Replicator Dynamics. Thus
the analysis (stable ￿xed points, basins￿of attraction sizes) of the ￿ unbounded￿rationality
case is identical to the one pertaining to the Replicator Dynamics in Coordination game (see
subsection (5)).









































(b) surface plot (W;￿;")
Figure 11: Coordination Game and Logit Dynamics-Long-run average welfare plots as func-
tion of payo⁄perturbation parameter " and the intensity of choice ￿. As " increases the long-
run average welfare increases. The long-run average welfare is non-monotonic as a function
of the intensity of choice ￿, with the maximum arising just before the ￿rst fold bifurcation.
316 Weighted Logit Dynamics(wLogit)
As stable limit cycles arise in 3-strategy game under Logit Dynamics, a natural question arises
whether more complicated behavior could also occur. One needs a four strategy game to get a
proper three dimensional continuous-time evolutionary system which is the minimum dimen-
sion that may generate chaotic behavior. In this last section we run computer simulations
for a four-strategy Schuster et al. (1991) example , from the perspective of a di⁄erent type of






￿ xi; ￿ = ￿
￿1 (26)
This evolutionary dynamic has the appealing property that when ￿ approaches 0 it con-
verges to the Replicator Dynamics (with adjustment speed scaled down by a factor ￿) and
when the intensity of choice is very large it approaches the Best Response dynamic (Hofbauer





B B B B
@
0 0:5 ￿0:1 0:1
1:1 0 ￿0:6 0
￿0:5 1 0 0
1:7 + ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿0:2 0
1
C C C
C C C C
A
(27)
The Logit dynamics on this payo⁄ matrix "only" displays stable periodic behavior for
intermediate values of the intensity of choice ￿. The vector ￿eld generated by the weighted
Logit dynamics (26) along with the underlying game matrix (27) is investigated numerically
in the sequel. Schuster et al. (1991) show that, within a speci￿c payo⁄ parameter region [
￿0:2 < ￿ < ￿0:105]; a Feigenbaum sequence of period doubling bifurcations unfolds under the
Replicator Dynamics and, eventually, chaos sets in. Here we consider the question whether
the weighted version of the Logit Dynamics displays similar patterns, for a given payo⁄
perturbation ￿; when the intensity of choice ￿ is varied. First we ￿x ￿ to ￿0:2 (the value for
32which the Replicator generates ￿ only￿periodic behaviour in Schuster et al. (1991)) and run
computer simulations for di⁄erent ￿:Cycles of increasing period multiplicity are reported in
Fig. 12ad. For ￿ = 2:5 the wLogit Dynamics already enters the chaotic regime on a strange
attractor (Fig. 12ef).
33(a) ￿ = 0:48: period￿1 cycle (b) ￿ = 1: period￿2 cycle
(c) ￿ = 2:1: period￿4 cycle (d) ￿ = 2:2: period￿8 cycle
(e) Strange attractor (f) Strange attractor
Figure 12: Schuster et. al. (1991) game and wLogit Dynamics. Period-Doubling route to
chaos. Panels (a)-(d): cycles of increasing period are obtained if the intensity of choice ￿
increases. Panels (e)-(f): projections of the strange attractor onto 2 two-dimensional state
subspace.
347 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper was to show that, even for ￿ simple￿three-strategy games, periodic
attractors do occur under a rationalistic way of modelling evolution in games, the Logit
dynamics. The resulting dynamical systems were investigated with respect to changes in both
the payo⁄ and behavioral parameters. Identifying stable cyclic behaviour in such a system
translates into proving that a generic, non-degenerate Hopf bifurcation occurs. By means of
normal form computations, we showed ￿rst that a non-degenerate Hopf can not occur for
Replicator Dynamics, when the number of strategies is three for games like Rock-Scissors-
Paper. In these games, under the Replicator Dynamics, only a degenerate Hopf bifurcation
can occur. However, in Logit dynamics, even for the three strategy case, stable cycles are
created, via a generic, non-degenerate, supercritical Hopf bifurcation. Another ￿nding is
that the periodic attractors can be generated either by varying the payo⁄ parameters (";￿)
or the behavioral parameter intensity of choice (￿). Moreover, via numerical detection of
bifurcation curves in a Coordination game, under the Logit Dynamics we showed that display
multiple, isolated, interior steady states exist, created by a fold catastrophe, a bifurcation
which cannot occur under the Replicator. Interestingly, a measure of aggregate welfare reaches
a maximum only for intermediate values of ￿; just before the ￿rst fold catastrophe, when most
of the population manages to coordinate close to the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Last, in
a frequency-weighted version of Logit dynamics and for a 4 ￿ 4 game, period-doubling route
to chaos along with strange attractors emerged when the intensity of choice took moderate,
￿ boundedly rational￿values. An interesting topic for future research is to run laboratory
experiments with human subjects to ￿nd out which evolutionary selection dynamics - either
an imitation-based, in the spirit of Replicator or a more involved, belief-based dynamics a la
Logit - is more relevant for players actual learning behavior.
35Appendix A: Rock-Scissor-Paper game with Logit Dynamics:
Computation of the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient
In order to discriminate between a degenerate and a non-degenerate bifurcations we need






















































Next, applying formula (10) for the computation of the ￿rst Lyapunov coe¢ cient, we




2 ￿ 4320"2 ￿ 4320￿" + 1728￿
2 + 1728"2
19￿











3(3" ￿ 3￿)2 < 0:
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